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This paper claims that besides training and equipment shortcomings, Argentine
command  structure  was  another  source  of  problems  that  affected  the  military
operations  during  the  Falklands/Malvinas  Campaign  during  April-June  1982.
Consequently, the flawed command structure can be seen as a contributing factor
in Argentina’s military defeat.
Improvisation, confusion, lack of coordination, and desperation prevailed
along  the  command  structure  throughout  the  conflict.  Operational  and  tactical
commands were seem to be pulling apart between the political imperatives of the
High Command in Buenos Aires that transcended to the islands and the military
imperatives of the front. This handicap was critical to conduct operations. By using
official  documents,  reports  and  accounts  and  the  own  participants’  testimonies,
this paper clarifies the issues connected with the structure of the Argentine High
Command and it furthers our understanding of how the Argentine armed forces
functioned.
(*) Revised version of the paper delivered at the Society for Military History 2000. Quantico, Virginia,
April 28-30 April 2000.
(**)The  opinions  expressed  in  this  paper  belong  to  the  author  and  do  not  necessarily  reflect  those  of
UCEMA.2
Due to the lack of planning for the post occupation and defense of the islands, the successive operations
were ordered and improvised “on the march.”1
After months of careful preparation, on April 2nd 1982, Argentine troops
occupied  the  Malvinas  Islands.    The  British  government  decided  to  recapture
these islands by sending a naval task force and troops to the South Atlantic.  The
decision caught the Argentine High Command completely by surprise.  They had
no  contingency  plan  to  defend  the  recently  acquired  territory.    Under  the
circumstances,  they  had  to  set  up  a  new  command  structure.    Improvisation,
confusion, lack of coordination, and desperation plagued, nonetheless, along the
command structure throughout the campaign.2  Argentine military authorities
could not develop a coherent and well-coordinated command structure.
Although  the  official  accounts  stress  that  cooperation  among  services
prevailed, a closer reading of the same sources shows that there were numerous
criticisms  and  friction.    Contradictory  decisions  were  taken,  and  tactical
commands resented the decisions made from above.
During the campaign the operational and tactical commands were caught
between the political imperatives of the High Command in Buenos Aires that
transcended to the islands, the military imperatives of the front, and their own
limitations.  This handicap was critical to conduct operations.
Although much has been written about the military details of the war,
there has not been any systematic analysis of the Argentine command structure.
This paper aims to fill this gap.  It also shows that besides poor training and
equipment shortcomings, Argentine command structure was another source of
problems  that  adversely  affected  the  military  operations  in  the  field.
Consequently, the flawed command structure can be seen as a contributing factor
in Argentina’s military defeat.
By using official documents, reports, accounts and the participants’ own
testimonies, this paper aims to clarify the issues connected with the structure of
the  Argentine  High  Command  and  to  further  our  understanding  of  how  the
Argentine armed forces functioned.
Part I of this work outlines the organization of the Argentine command
structure  during  the  Malvinas  campaign.  The  second  part  explains  the3
organizational arrangements particular to the Argentine Air Force.  The final part
shows  how  the  organization  of  the  command  affected  the  troops  in  the
battlefield.
I.
After the capture of the Malvinas, the Argentine garrison was established
as planed. The Army troops soon totaled 500 men.  They belonged to the 25th
Infantry Regiment (25th IR), 181 Military Police Company for security duties (181
MP Coy. (-)), and part of the 9th Engineer Company (9th Eng. Coy.)  There were
also present some elements of the Air Force and the Navy providing support to
the garrison.3
Changes in the external situation soon compelled the Junta to review their
defensive plans.  On April 3, the United Nations Security Council passed the
Resolution 502, which favored Britain.4  With this support, Great Britain declared
that  it  was  going  to  contest  the  Argentine  occupation  by  sending  an
expeditionary  force  to  the  South  Atlantic.    These  events  triggered  the  first
modification of the original Argentine defense plan.5  By April 5, it was evident
that the British were going to fight back.  That same day, the Commander of the
Malvinas Operational Theater (TOM), Bde.-Gen. Osvaldo García, considered that
the  original  500  troops  allotted  to  garrison  the  islands  were  insufficient  to
withstand a British invasion.6  Therefore, he asked for more troops.7  The Junta
immediately ordered to the islands an armored car squadron (10 A Car Sq.) with
10  wheeled  armored  Panhard  vehicles.    More  important  was  the  decision  to
reinforce  the  garrison  by  sending  two  major  combat  units,  the  8th  Infantry
Regiment (8th IR) from Comodoro Rivadavia and the 5th Marine Battalion (BIM 5),
from  Río  Grande,  Tierra  del  Fuego.8    The  contingent  also  included  the  3rd
Artillery Group (3rd AG) from Paso de los Libres.9  These units were immediately
airlifted to Puerto Argentino.  The BIM 5 was added to the defenses around the
islands  capital,  Puerto  Argentino,  while  the  whole  8th  IR  had  as  its  final
destination  Fox  Bay  in  the  Gran  Malvina  Island  (West  Falkland  Island).10
Because these last infantry units were stationed in Patagonia, they were the best
adapted to the Malvinas environment.  This criterion was later abandoned by the
Argentine  High  Command,  when  they  started  to  rush  more  troops  to  the
islands.11
After these changes, on April 7, the Junta’s Decree 700/82 created a new
command, the South Atlantic Theater of Operations (TOAS) under Vice Admiral
Juan Lombardo.  At the same time, the TOM was dissolved. Both the surface and
air naval forces and all the forces stationed in the Malvinas islands came under4
the command of the TOAS.  At the same time, in a ceremony in the Islands’
capital,  Brig.-Gen.  Mario  Benjamín  Menéndez  was  installed  as  Military
Governor.    Two  days  later,  he  was  also  appointed  commander  of  the  newly
created  Joint  Force  of  the  Malvinas  Military  Garrison  (Fuerza  Conjunta  de  la
Guarnición  Militar  Malvinas,  GMM).12    This  command  was  given  the  general
direction of the operations in the islands.  Consequently, the commands from
each force branch (army, air force,  and  navy)  came  under  the  orders  of  Gen.
Menéndez.13    By  now,  the  number  of  troops  stationed  in  the  islands  had
increased  to  approximately  2500.  Brig.-Gen.  Américo  Daher  was  appointed
Commander  of  the  Land  Forces  in  Malvinas  (Agrupación  Ejército  Malvinas,
AEM).14  The Army component had the 8th IR and Element from 9th Eng. Coy.
stationed at Fox Bay in the Gran Malvina Island.  A Company from the 25th IR
occupied Darwin-Goose Green.  Finally, the 25th IR (-), the BIM 5, the armored car
vehicles, and 3rd AG occupied positions around Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley)
on the Soledad Island (East Falkland).  Logistic, communications and military
police  units  supported  them.    The  Air  Force  command  (Agrupación  Fuerza
Aérea Malvinas, AFAM) had Pucará airplanes and AAA units, and the Navy
command  (Agrupación  Armada  Malvinas,  AAM)  had  Airmacchi  and  Turbo
Mentor airplanes and some patrol and transport vessels.15
The TOAS constituted primarily a naval command because of the nature
of  the  operational  theater.    For  the  Malvinas  campaign,  the  Air  Force  had  a
collateral command, Air Force South (FAS) which operated in the South Atlantic.
This command came under the direct orders of the Junta and it was supposed to
coordinate its actions with the TOAS.16
Also on April 7, Brig.-Gen. Daher issued in Port Stanley his operational
plan for the defense of the islands.17  The plan determined the defense of three
“key” zones (strongpoints): Port Stanley and Darwin-Goose Green in Soledad
Island, and Fox Bay in the Gran Malvina Island.  The rest of the territory was to
be covered by airmobile patrols.18
Nevertheless,  two  days  later,  the  second  important  modification  in  the
troop allocation occurred.  On April 9, the Commander of the TOAS and his staff
visited Malvinas.  There, Brig.-Gen. Menéndez explained Daher’s defense plans.
All  present  at  the  meeting  agreed  that  reinforcements  were  necessary.19
However, Menéndez warned that the precarious logistic situation in the islands
precluded large reinforcements.  At the same time, in the distant Buenos Aires
the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army  and  also  President,  Lt.-Gen.  Leopoldo
Galtieri, without consulting his staff, urgently ordered to the islands the whole X
Mechanized  Infantry  Brigade  (X  Bde.).    Surprisingly,  Menéndez  was  not
informed of this decision.20  Therefore, while he was expecting the reinforcement
of one infantry regiment, the 3rd, he received instead a total of three regiments5
and supporting units.  These were the already mentioned 3rd, plus the 6th, and the
7th Infantry Regiments.  This great battle unit was airlifted to the islands without
its armored vehicles and organic artillery component.
Between April 11 and 16, the X Bde. under the command of Brig.-Gen.
Oscar Jofre arrived on the islands.  According to Col. Cervo, former member of
Menéndez staff, the presence of so many troops was welcome but the problem
was how to adequately supply them.  He thought that only those in the islands
clearly  understood  the  effectiveness  that  the  British  blockade  imposed  on
supplying the defenders.  He commented that this attitude contrasted with that
of those in the continent that had the “fever” to accumulate troops without any
consideration  about  their  adaptation  to  the  environment  and  operative
capabilities.21  The arrival of the new troops demanded the modification of plans,
new logistic calculations, and revised troops movements.22
For  Argentines,  logistic  support  remained  a  problem  throughout  the
conflict.  Each armed service had its own logistic and supply organization and
they decided by themselves what to transport to the islands.  Because the Navy
and the Air Force had their own transport airplanes, they never suffered much
shortage.  The Army had no such advantage and depended heavily on the two
other services.  Consequently, Army troops were the ones that suffered most.
After the war, however, it was noted that during the campaign the problem was
not  the  availability  but  the  distribution  of  essential  supplies.23    There  was  a
chronic scarcity of adequate motorized transports.  Because the roughness of the
terrain most of the supplies had to be moved by hand.  In the long run, these
activities ended up wearing out the troops.24  To cope with the logistics, the AEM
organized on April 10 the Logistics Operations Center (Centro de Operaciones
Logísticas,  COL).    The  organization  centralized  all  available  trucks  and  was
responsible  for  the  depots  and  the  logistic  support  in  the  combat  zone  of
Malvinas.25  Despite this organization and not until the arrival of the cargo ship
Formosa to Puerto Argentino, the units of the X Bde. had to share the logistics
organization of the units already stationed in the islands.  This situation was not
easy and added a complication to the troops’ daily life.
On April 12, Vice Admiral Lombardo issued the TOAS campaign defense
plan.26  According to some analysts, the plan was too ambitious in its goals and
too general given the means available.  In effect, it did not suggest what kind of
battle  the  Argentine  forces  should  fight.    It  merely  planned  for  acting  on
“favorable  opportunities.”    Finally,  the  strategy  was  not  truly  joint  planning
because  it  assigned  a  limited  role  to  the  air  and  naval  components.27  The
difficulty stemmed from the fact that the TOAS was primarily a naval command.
It had very few Air Force planes under its direct control. For the campaign, the
Air  Force  had  its  own  specific  collateral  command,  the  Strategic  Air  Force6
(Fuerza Aérea Estratégica, FAE).  On paper, the General Joint Staff coordinated
the Air Force operations, which complicated coordination between the forces in
Malvinas and the Air Force units in the continent.28
Surprisingly,  Menéndez,  the  Joint  Commander  of  the  garrison,  did  not
receive TOAS defense plan until ten days later, on April 23.29  Therefore, the new
land commander, Brig.-Gen. Jofre, learned about it after he had already issued
and was in the process of implementing his own defense plan.
By  April  12,  Great  Britain  started  the  enforcement  of  the  Maritime
Exclusion Zone.  The zone covered within an area of 200 nautical miles from the
center of the Malvinas.  According to the Argentine Army Official Report, that
was the beginning of the British “siege” to the islands.  Starting on that date, all
communications  with  the  islands  went  solely  through  the  air.    The  situation
compelled Argentines to resort to airlift “with limited transport capacity.”30
Three days later, Menéndez appointed Brig.-Gen. Jofre as commander of
AEM  because  he  was  senior  to  Brig.-Gen.  Daher.    The  latter  returned  to  the
continent  to  his  former  position  as  Commander  of  the  IX  Infantry  Brigade.
However, his staff was added to Jofre’s staff.31
On  April  16,  the  new  land  forces  commander,  Jofre,  issued  his  own
defense plan. He did not change much of Daher’s original plan.  The X Bde.’s
staff with the addition of Daher’s former staff worked feverishly to prepare it.32
According to new plan, Army and Marine forces would defend the same key
sectors: Port Stanley, Darwin-Goose Green, and Fox Bay. To some participants
there was no other choice.  The new plan modified the position already in placed
and the new units were added in a “patchy” way.33  Nevertheless, it was clear in
the plan that the center of the defense rested on the islands’ capital.  The outcome
of the campaign would be sealed if the British capture it.  The plan also stated
that the defensive positions would act as strongholds mutually supported with
local  reserves  to  counterattack.    The  defenders  would  constitute  an  airborne
reserve. In Port Stanley, the artillery was put under a unified command.34
Jofre  rejects  the  assertion  that  his  operational  plan  was  merely  the
continuation of Daher’s but he acknowledges he made good use of what had
been done.  The increased number of troops added to the theater and the need to
defend areas not defended before prompted many necessary changes.  The new
plan  also  included  the  coordination  of  the  air  support  from  the  AFAM  and
improved  the  logistical  planning.35    Consequently,  on  April  20,  a  new  order
assigned the three newly arrived regiments to reinforce the defensive perimeter
surrounding Port Stanley.36
The next day the cargo vessel Formosa docked at Puerto Argentino.  Her
arrival was welcome since she brought part of the heavy equipment of the X Bde.7
Most importantly, it landed the kitchen equipment that eased the burden on the
other units logistic services to provide meals.37
On April 22 occurred the third important modification in the allocation of
troops to the defense of islands.38  That day, Lt.-Gen. Galtieri visited Port Stanley.
He and his staff were informed of the defensive measures implemented by the
Joint Command (GMM).  All present at the meeting agreed on two important
issues.    They  considered  the  reserves  in  Port  Stanley  insufficient,  and  they
believed that with the troops available the enemy could operate freely in other
parts  of  the  islands.    Vice  Admiral  Lombardo,  TOAS  commander,  was  not
present at the meeting.  Later, Galtieri and the other visitors flew over the area in
company of Brig.-Gen. Jofre.  After the aerial inspection the visitors agreed to
send  a  new  regiment  to  the  islands,  the  5th  that  belonged  to  the  III  Infantry
Brigade (III  Bde.).  The official visit ended at 5 p.m.  The same night, at 11.30
p.m.,  the  Teletype  in  Port  Stanley  printed  the  news  that  they  were  going  to
receive not only the 5th regiment but also the whole III Bde (!)  This big battle
formation fell under the command of Brig.-Gen. Omar Parada.39  This decision
again added new stress to the staff, which by then was discussing where to place
the new regiment.  It also imposed new burden on the logistic system of the
garrison.  The III Bde. comprised the infantry regiments 4th, 5th, 12th, and the 4th
Artillery Group (Airborne).40  Once again, the troops were airlifted to the islands
while leaving behind most of its heavy equipment. Most remarkably was the fact
that  the  peacetime  station  of  the  brigade  was  the  subtropical  province  of
Corrientes.41  According to one witness, Galtieri’s decision responded to his fears
about the incoming British Task Force and the information about the number of
troops approaching to the islands.  However, “the allocation of troops did not
responded to any coherent planning, and it was the result of the urgency and
improvisation.”42
The  next  day,  Brig.-Gen.  García  returned  to  the  islands  representing
Galtieri.  He wanted to know what would be the deployment of the new brigade.
After a  meeting  with  Menéndez,  they  decided  to  send  one  of  its  regiment  to
Darwin.    Most  importantly,  it  was  decided  to  reinforce  the  defense  of  Gran
Malvina Island by sending another regiment to Port Howard.  Sources agree that
Menendez  and  his  staff  opposed  the  plan  because  it  would  situate  the  two
regiments in completely isolated positions with little chance of receiving external
support and no use at all.  But they were overruled, for political reasons; Galtieri
and the Junta wanted the island to be occupied.43  Finally, between April 24 and
the 28, the units of the III Bde. arrived on the islands.
Brig.-Gen. Daher returned to the islands on April 25 to help Menéndez in
his role as Joint Commander of the Military Garrison Malvinas.  Daher became
his chief of staff.  According to the Army’s official report, despite the name of8
“joint commander” of the forces in Malvinas, in practical terms, his staff operated
as an advisory and coordinating team without any supporting personnel.  The
commands of each of the services coordinated their actions as best they could,
but they did not work according to the true concept of “joint” command.44
With two brigades now under his command, Menéndez reorganized it.
On April 28, one day after the British recovered the South Georgias Islands, he
ordered the dissolution of the AEM. Two new commands replaced the old one.
The command responsible for the defense of the capital and surroundings sector
became the Agrupación Ejército Puerto Argentino (X Bde., AEPA).  It defended
the  zone  East  of  the  line  Puerto  Salvador-Fitz  Roy.    This  included  the  city,
Peninsula Freycenet, and Peninsula San Luis.  Its mission was to deny the enemy
its  main  strategic  objective,  Port  Stanley.    The  second  command  was  named
Agrupación Ejército Litoral (III Bde., AEL).  It was responsible for the defense of
the coastal sector. It comprised the western part of Soledad Island (East Falkland)
including  Darwin-Goose  Green,  and  the  whole  Gran  Malvina  Island  (West
Falkland).45  See Figure 2.
By April 30, two regiments were deployed on the Gran Malvina Island,
the 8th IR at Fox Bay and the 5th IR at Port Howard.  Consequently, the former
became part of the III Bde. (AEL).  Likewise, the 4th IR that originally belonged to
the  III  Bde.  was  later  attached  to  the  defensive  perimeter  surrounding  Port
Stanley and became part of the X Bde.46
On May 1 the British carried out their first air bombardment of the islands.
This marked the beginning of the airnaval phase of the war.  During the period,
the  British  Task  Force  established  the  strategic  operational  siege  around  the
Malvinas by controlling the air and the sea spaces.47  After the May 1 attacks,
Menéndez decided to retain the 4th IR in the sector of Port Stanley.  From that day
on the Argentine garrison waited for British the landing, which finally came on
May 21 when the British landed in San Carlos on the west side of Soledad Island.
This event marked the start of the land phase of the conflict.  When writing about
this phase Jofre evoked despair:
The most remarkable of this land phase of the conflict was that the
Malvinas continued alone, abandoned to their own fate.48
  By mid May the strategic operational and tactical commands were really
concerned about the evolution of the campaign.  Both Lombardo and Menéndez
separately sent reports to the Junta assessing the situation to date as difficult.
The army units were spread thin with two regiments immobilized and isolated in
Gran Malvina Island, the logistical situation was fragile, and the armed services
in Malvinas bypassed the normal command channels by responding instead to9
their  respective  service  commands.    Finally,  the  British  totally  controlled  the
initiative. During a night meeting on May 23, the High Command in Port Stanley
learned that the Junta had ordered the creation of a new strategic operational
command named the Joint Operations Center (Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas,
CEOPECON).  Its creation intended to increase the managerial capacity of the
command chain, particularly after the British landing in San Carlos on May 21.
Unlike the TOAS, whose quarters were in Buenos Aires, CEOPECON quarters
were  in  Comodoro  Rivadavia.    The  members  of  the  new  command  were  the
Commander of the V Army Corps, Brig.-Gen. Osvaldo García, the Commander
of  the  Strategic  Air  Force  (FAE),  Brigadier  Mayor  Helmut  Weber,  and  the
Commander of the TOAS, Vice Admiral José Lombardo. Because CEOPECON
was a center and not a command, decisions were reached by consensus. This
measure was at best, in the opinion of some critics, “lukewarm.”  It should have
been  organized  as  a  command  and  earlier  in  the  campaign.  Moreover,  in
practical terms it did not solve the original factors that caused its creation.49  In
case of disagreement, the senior officer was the final decision authority, in this
case  Brig.-Gral.  García,.    Officially  the  mission  of  the  CEOPECON  was  to
coordinate the armed services at the strategic operational level.50  It controlled all
forces under the TOAS, the CAE, and the Army strategic reserves.  The creation
of the new command structure was kept secret, and conversely, TOAS was never
officially  eliminated.51    Thereafter,  it  was  expected  that  all  communications,
reports and requests from the islands would be channeled through the Center.
The coordination problems increased because of the frequent intervention of the
Commanders in Chief of each service and by subordinate commands, which used
to communicate directly with their own Commander in Chief, thus bypassing the
operational command, the TOAS.  An army officer explained that as the conflict
progressed “the authority and efficacy of the commanding officer of the TOAS
was being diluted.52  Moreover, after the fighting began on May 1 the TOAS had
difficulties in coordinating operations with the command of the Air Force South
(FAS).53
On May 26, the CEOPECON ordered Menéndez to carry out an attack on
the beachhead in San Carlos. For the attack Menéndez was authorized to employ,
if  necessary,  the  units  in  Fox  and  Howard.    The  command  in  Port  Stanley
considered such action impossible. Gen. Jofre wrote in his personal diary:
There existed an evident ignorance [in the continent] of that combat
zone,  the  capabilities  of  the  enemy  and  our  own
scarcities…particularly our own lack of mobility.5410
After  their  landing  in  San  Carlos,  British  paratroopers  marched  and
attacked the positions in Darwin-Goose Green.  After a two days battle, on May
29, the Argentine garrison surrended.55
Initially, the Joint Command had expected the most probable direction of
attack to come from the sea, with the British troops landing near Port Stanley.
Later, due to the changing situation Menéndez and Jofre decided to reinforce the
defenses from an attack in the west, while at the same time maintaining strong
coastal defenses to the east and south of the capital.  Therefore, they ordered the
4th IR, originally assigned to the III Bde., to come under the orders of the AEPA
and reinforced the western section of defense perimeter.56  Between May 29 and
June 3 the AEPA ordered adjustments in the perimeter.  When completed, the
troops  could  cover  only  37%  of  the  perimeter.  Consequently,  there  was  no
continuous  defensive  line.    The  resulting  gaps  allowed  later  the  enemy  to
infiltrate and to maneuver offensively.57
After the victory in Goose Green, the British advanced to Port Stanley and
concentrated their forces for the final assault to the capital.  Until June 8, the only
land actions were intense skirmishes between patrols.
In the early morning of June 8, Argentine troops deployed on the south
side  of  Mount  Harriet  observed  the  presence  of  British  warships  in  Bahía
Agradable (Port Pleasant).  They informed CEOPECON and the center asked the
Air Force for an air strike.  Argentine fighter-bombers surprised the British ships
unloading  troops  and  caused  important  damages.58    During  the  day  and  the
night,  British  airplanes  and  naval  artillery  persistently  bombed  the  Argentine
positions.    The  Argentine  command  in  Malvinas  considered  moving  out  and
counterattacking on the British in Fitz Roy, which was 16 km south west of Port
Stanley.  After some consideration the idea was rejected.  The command in the
capital preferred to maintain the combat capacity of the defending units and did
not want to move outside the coverage range from their artillery.59  However, the
commanding officer of the BIM 5, Commander Carlos Robacio, had initiated the
planning and was preparing his unit to counterattack while the British were still
in  shock  from  the  air  strike.    According  to  this  officer,  to  proceed  with  the
counterattack would have required Argentine units to move from the rear guard,
but the army command (AEPA) chose to refrain the force defending the capital.
Therefore,  Robacio  later  complained  that  because  the  defenders’  operational-
tactical  commands  unwillingness  some  army  units  practically  “watched”  the
battle without intervening.60
For the final assault, the British started the investment of the town from
the west and for three days they probed the defenses.  The western side of the
Argentine  defensive  perimeter  ran  along  the  heights  that  surrounded  Port
Stanley.  They ran from north to south: Wireless Ridge, Longdon, Two Sister,11
Harriet, Tumbledown, William, and Sapper Hill.  Argentine forces of company
size or less defended these hills in strongholds.  For this reason, the British could
concentrate  their  forces  and  proceed  to  attack  each  position  with  local
superiority.  They were also helped by the fact that the Argentine positions did
not mutually support one another.  Consequently, these final combats were a
series  of  firefights  in  which  the  British  reduced  piecemeal  the  Argentine
defenders without suffering any counterattack.
The final British assault had two phases. During the night of June 11-12,
the British Marine Commandos and Paratroopers attacked Longdon, Two Sisters
and Harriet. By the early morning they had captured the positions.  After a day
for  rest  and  further  preparations,  during  the  night  of  June  13-14,  British
paratroopers and Scots Guards assaulted the last line of mountains before Port
Stanley: Wireless Ridge, Tumbledown, and William.  In the morning of June 14
Argentine Marine and Army troops retreated to Sapper Hill, the last height in
their  hands  and  prepared  to  counter  attack.    The  Joint  Commander  and  the
commander  of  the  AEPA,  however,  considered  the  situation  untenable  and
hopeless, and they asked for a cease-fire.  When the fighting ended, the bulk of
three Argentine regiments (3rd, 6th, 25th IRs) deployed in the airfield and harbor
areas surrendered without having fired a single shot against the incoming British
troops.61
II.
During  the  Malvinas  campaign  the  Argentine  Air  Force  had  its  war
baptism.  Its war record was impressive but it concentrated particularly in two
activities, shipping attack and air supply operations.62  In terms of cooperation
with the other services, however, its record was not impressive at all.  From the
beginning of the campaign, the Air Force had established its own specific and
autonomous  command.    On  March  31,  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  AAF
created  the  Fuerza  Aerea  Sur  (FAS).    With  headquarters  were  in  Comodoro
Rivadavia, its responsibilities were to protect the whole territory of Patagonia
and to operate in the South Atlantic war zone.  FAS came under the command of
the  Strategic  Air  Force  (Fuerza  Aérea  Estratégica,  FAE).    There  was  no  joint
planning because the creation of the FAS responded to the concept of Task Air
Force.63  For this reason, the Air Force acknowledges that the FAS commanding
officer confronted a strained relationship with the others collateral commands
because the superimposition of the authority conflicted with the TOAS, which
also included the Malvinas military garrison (GMM).  The Navy complained that12
the Air Force conducted independent and autonomous maritime air operations,
particularly air search and rescue, maritime patrols, and attacks on naval targets.
The  Air  Force  units  were  not  subordinated  to  the  TOAS,  consequently,  they
carried  on  their  own  naval  war  looking  for  “lucrative”  targets  unrelated  to
specific  military  operational  needs.64    The  Army  also  protested  on  several
occasions for the lack of air support during the land battle, claiming that it was
difficult to coordinate air strikes with an autonomous air command.65  In contrast,
the cooperation and camaraderie between navy and air force pilots were more
apparent in the air bases on the continent.66
III.
In the defense of the Malvinas, Argentine troops fought the crucial battle
for Port Stanley under the most unfavorable conditions.  Their positions were
attacked and surrounded by superior forces, and then they were eliminated one
by  one.    Meanwhile,  other  units  would  not  come  to  their  support.    They
remained as spectators during the night infantry duels.  Why such a debacle?
What  was  the  impact  of  the  command  structure  in  the  land  war  against  the
British?  Here we will delineate the more important factors.
Many Argentine troops suffered privations from poor logistic planning.
Even when there were enough supplies in the warehouses and containers in Port
Stanley they could not be adequately distributed.  There was an almost absolute
lack of motorized transportation.  Thus much of the supplies were carried by
shoulder  with  the  consequent  tiring  of  the  troops.    There  were  not  enough
helicopters, and if there were enough they lacked crane systems to lift heavy
equipment.  Most troop movements were carried out by foot.
There were also several modifications and rectification in the defensive
positions,  and  each  time  the  troops  had  to  dig  in  the  rocky  soil  their  new
positions.
All analysts agree that there was poor planning throughout the campaign.
In the Continent, the High Command seemed more concerned about a possible
engagement with Chile and they remained obsessed with that idea, even when
the British Task Force was sailing towards the South Atlantic.  They kept the best
troops  sitting,  facing  the  Chilean  border  waiting  for  an  attack  that  never
materialized while other less prepared troops were fighting for their lives.  Poor
planning also affected logistics.
Remarkably, the justification that the Argentine military cite was their lack
of  any  doctrine  for  joint  operations.    However,  they  also  boast  the  original
landing and capture of the Malvinas was a model combined operation.13
The organization of the command structure was deficient and it nearly
collapsed  in  mid-May,  a  week  before  the  British  landing  in  San  Carlos.    The
TOAS was an airnaval command without many resources to support the land
fighting.  This command had practically no air force resources.  These were kept
under the control of the Air Force, which created a collateral command with a
cumbersome chain of command to coordinate air strikes.  Consequently, land
troops suffered from lack of air support when they were most needed.67
The  organization  that  replaced  the  TOAS,  the  CEOPECON,  could  not
solve the problems of coordination and competition among the armed services
that plagued the campaign.  Despite the bad experience with the TOAS, the High
Command created the CEOPECON as a center and not a command.  Therefore,
only  the  good  will  of  all  parties  facilitated  the  continuation  of  the  campaign.
Moreover, according to some sources, the coordinator of the center, Brig.-Gen.
García continued to act merely as a representative of Lt.-Gen. Galtieri.68
On several occasions, Galtieri intervened personally and made decisions
without consulting his staff or against the advice of the operational and tactical
commands.  For example, he decided to send the III Bde. without informing to
Brig.-Gen. Menéndez, the military governor and joint commander in Malvinas.
The  political  authorities  put  political  considerations  above  operational
concerns.  Political leaders ordered to occupy with considerable forces the Gran
Malvina Islands.  In this way they wasted the power of two infantry regiments.69
One of them came from Patagonia and was better adapted to the terrain.  These
two  were  literally  abandoned  to  their  own  resources  because  there  were  no
means  to  supply  them.    Consequently,  these  regiments  suffered  unnecessary
extreme deprivations.  Moreover, because the lack of mobility they were unable
to  intervene  decisively  in  the  combat  on  the  Soledad  Island.    When  the
CEOPECON unrealistically ordered them to attack the British rear they could not
move from their isolated positions.
  Finally,  many  of  the  important  decisions  that  greatly  affected  the
campaign in Malvinas were taken by commands far removed from the theater of
operations.  With some exceptions, very few ever visited it or stayed long enough
to learn about its characteristics.  They were ignorant of the real conditions in the
Islands  and  lacked  any  intelligence  on  the  British.    In  addition,  they  also
sometimes were deceived by optimistic information coming from the islands.
There  were  many  military  personnel  sent  to  the  islands  during  the
campaign that have been very critical of the leadership of those commands in the
continent.  The most extreme vision states that14
the main causes of the defeat of the Argentine armed forces in the
[Malvinas]  campaign  were  the  faulty  superior  level  command,
political-military of the conflict.70
There  were  also  psychological  factors  that  affected  the  conduct  of
operations during the campaign.  In this case, once again the commands on the
continent seemed to ascribe to the illusion that Great Britain was not going to
react and fight for the repossession of the islands.71
The priority was assigned to diplomatic negotiations implied the
idea that the war was not going to became the arena of definition of
the conflict.72
This  assertion  is  similar  to  other  opinion  expressed  by  foreign  analysts.    For
instance, Harry Train commented that “Argentine leaders did not believe they
would have to fight.”73  Leonard Wainstein has also observed that “it probably
seemed incredible to the Argentines that they would actually have to go to war,
and against Great Britain.”74
According to Commander Robacio, the high command in Port Stanley was
also psychologically affected by an inferiority complex that magnified the British
capabilities.  These mental images exaggerated British capabilities.  There was a
constant fear and concern of those in the locality about a possible landing in the
surrounding  shores,  or  landings  by  helicoptered  troops,  and/or  the  constant
action of commandos.  These excessive fears motivated the decisions to maintain
an important number of troops defending the coasts near Port Stanley instead of
reinforcing the western perimeter when the British attack began.  Because of the
fear of commando attacks, the lights of Port Stanley were kept on all night, thus
helping  British  artillery  spotters  who  controlled  the  fire  over  the  Argentine
positions in the surrounding mountains.75  Robacio adds that the commands in
the  locality  also  had  a  precarious  concept  of  risk;  apparently  they  had  “risk
averse” mindset.  They exaggerate the impassability of the terrain.  They also
assigned an insufficient number of troops for counterattacks.  This made it easier
for the British to repel these attacks to overwhelm the defensive perimeter.76
According  to  most  analysts  during  the  campaign  Argentine  forces
suffered not only from a lack of strategic operational planning but also from poor
coordination, competition, and rivalry among the three armed services.  Far from
solving these problems, the war imperatives worsened them and contributed to
the defeat.  The key issue is that these problems affected the chances of survival
of drafted soldiers who where just dropped in the islands.15
  Once  again,  the  study  of  this  campaign  shows  that  war  is  not  only  a
problem  of  sophisticate  technology  and  equipment  but  also  of  sophisticated
human management.16
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